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Abstract
In the knowledge-based view of the firm, organizational knowledge and expertise are recognized as primary
drivers of continuous innovation and competitive advantage. However, as an intangible resource knowledge
resides within individuals who personally value their skills and therefore have an implicit incentive to keep
knowledge private. Consequently, it is necessary for organizations to provide adequate rewards to control
the diffusion and utilization of knowledge among their employees. The purpose of this paper is to develop
and analyze a reward structure that motivates agents to generate additional knowledge and subsequently
share it with co-workers. In this context, creation and sharing are considered costly actions that, in turn,
decrease the cost of providing an output-oriented effort. The optimal incentive structure is derived to bal-
ance the explicit incentives of monetary rewards and the implicit benefits associated with a higher level of
private knowledge. The model suggests that organizations need to choose whether they want to emphasize
either the creation or dissemination of knowledge. The optimal effort level for sharing knowledge depends
not only on an agent’s personal incentive, but more importantly on the marginal productivity and the in-
centive of other agents to efficiently apply the shared knowledge. However, stronger incentives to generate
knowledge have a detrimental effect on each agent’s willingness to share and vice versa. The findings in
this paper should help to further understand organizational learning and the transfer of developed knowl-
edge. Furthermore, it provides insights into the trade-off between the creation and sharing of knowledge,
which should aid managers to better design incentive contracts for employees to focus their attention on
the desired task.
Keywords: knowledge sharing, principal-agent, learning, knowledge management, co-operation
”Every afternoon our corporate knowledge walks out the door and I hope to God they’ll
be back tomorrow”
—–Miller (1998), Keynote Address
1 Introduction
In the past three decades the creation, utilization and especially the diffusion of knowl-
edge within organizations has drawn the attention of both researchers and companies alike
(Hislop, 2010). In the knowledge-based view of the firm, organizational knowledge and
expertise are even considered as primary drivers of continuous innovation and competi-
tive advantage (e.g. Argote and Ingram (2000), Davenport and Prusak (1998), Nonaka
et al. (2000)). However, knowledge that is kept private only benefits single employees or
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departments, whereas units that work together can leverage benefits of mutual creation
and sharing. Therefore, it is in the interest of organizations to control the diffusion and
utilization of knowledge among their employees. In general, knowledge transfer can be
defined as the process in which one unit of a firm is affected by the expertise of others (Sin-
gley and Anderson, 1989) and occurs through different mechanisms including formal and
informal exchanges among co-workers, organizational databases, communities of practice
or the transfer of technologies (Davenport and Prusak, 1998).
Implementing knowledge sharing and knowledge management programs potentially offers
multiple benefits towards a company. It builds up repositories and prevents the loss of
knowledge due to employee turnovers or transfers. It fosters the diffusion of innovations
throughout the organization so that the company as whole can benefit from the findings of
single workers or divisions. It further helps to avoid redundancies from repeating the same
work processes or researching the same information. Gathering heterogeneous knowledge
allows companies to leverage synergy effects by combining different streams of expertise. In
general it is assumed that effective knowledge management lowers the cost of production.
Recognizing the potential benefits of managing knowledge exchange, many companies have
already successfully implemented knowledge management systems or programs. For exam-
ple Siemens (Davenport and Probst, 2002), Hewlett and Packard (Davenport and Vo¨lpel,
2001), Toyota (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) and all of the Big Four (Vera-Munoz et al.,
2006) report significant performance increases due to the diffusion of employee knowledge
within the organization. Moreover, in a study conducted by KPMG 81 percent of included
European and American companies either already had or were currently working on imple-
menting a knowledge management program. However, of the companies that implemented
knowledge management into their organizational routine 36 percent reported that benefits
failed to meet the expectations (KPMG, 2000).
In contrast to more typical factors of production, knowledge resides within individuals who
dynamically generate and implement it to fulfill their tasks. Knowledge therefore can best
be described as an intangible asset. The process of knowledge sharing itself is unobservable
and unverifiable, thus there are no measures that can effectively be utilized for contracting
purposes. Moreover, fostering knowledge sharing might not always be in the best interest
of the principal. Companies need to consider possible trade-offs between the creation,
diffusion and application of knowledge. Baum and Ingram (1998) argue that knowledge
transfer can have negative effects, if the transferred knowledge is too complex and cannot
be adopted by the recipients. Additionally, sharing is costly to agents in two ways: First, it
requires time and effort to structure knowledge in order to render it transferable. Second,
employees personally value their knowledge and skills, thus are reluctant to freely share
their information (Blair, 2002). Workers might even consider colleagues as competitors
within the firm or on the labor market and thus feel that they jeopardize employment or
promotion opportunities by giving up power (Davenport and Probst, 2002). As a result,
appropriate reward structures are necessary to foster knowledge sharing among co-workers.
Even though, knowledge sharing has received an increased interest from researchers in the
past, insights about the economic effects of rewards are still limited. The purpose of this
paper is to address this research gap by developing and analyzing a reward structure that
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motivates agents to both generate knowledge to decrease their individual effort costs of pro-
duction and subsequently to share this knowledge to indirectly influence the performance
of co-workers. Furthermore, the necessary conditions for when and how much knowledge
sharing is preferred by the principal are analyzed. Through the analysis of the principal-
agent model and the resulting equilibrium surpluses, the paper is able to show that mutual
knowledge creation and sharing among employees is in optimum desired by the principal.
However, the principal cannot necessarily control the allocation of an employee’s time and
effort among the tasks. It is not sufficient to motivate one agent to share knowledge as
it alone adds no value to the firms output, but instead individual and sharing oriented
incentives have to be in place to both motivate the diffusion and application of knowledge.
Furthermore, when agents vary in their skill level, especially in their marginal productivity,
the less skilled worker only witnesses a minor increase in his output upon receiving shared
knowledge. In this situation, it is optimal for the less productive employee to assume the
role of a support and to focus on generating and supplying knowledge towards the more
productive worker who can better integrate knowledge into his already superior routines
to maximize the effect on performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a short
overview of the related literature. Second, a principal-agent model is developed to ex-
plore the multi-task moral hazard problem in which a single agent can generate additional
knowledge to decrease his disutility of providing an output related effort. Furthermore,
the optimal incentive structure is derived to balance the explicit incentives of monetary re-
wards and the implicit benefits associated with a higher level of private knowledge. Third,
the presented model is extended to incorporate an additional agent in order to analyze the
strategic interaction of creating and sharing knowledge. In an extension to the multi-agent
setting, the principal faces the decision of investing into knowledge management technol-
ogy, which in turn lowers the agents’ effort costs of sharing knowledge and provides a signal
that can be utilized for contracting. Finally, the findings and implications are discussed
and possible limitations as well as avenues for future research are addressed.
2 Related Literature
As highlighted in the introduction, a vast amount of articles on the topic of knowledge
management is available from multiple research streams. However, in this section only
contributions from literature related to theoretical approaches that model the exchange of
information among co-workers are highlighted.
In a game theoretical approach, Loebecke et al. (1999) model an agent’s decision to share
knowledge with a co-worker. In the proposed game, two agents have the choice of either
sharing or hoarding their knowledge. When both agents decide to share their knowledge
they gain a synergetic value from mutual knowledge sharing but lose the monopolistic value
of keeping their knowledge private. The situation in which both agents cooperate with each
other maximizes the social surplus, however each agent has the incentive to deviate from
this strategy and instead keep their knowledge private. In the game, the agents are not
able to convincingly commit to sharing knowledge with each other and the game can thus
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be described as a prisoner’s dilemma. The resulting Nash-equilibrium is a situation in
which nobody shares his information, even though both agents would be better off if they
combined their knowledge. Consequently, due to costs of sharing and the loss of private
benefits, the strategy to hoard knowledge is dominant. The approach of the game theo-
retical model provides insights into the topic of knowledge sharing or cooperation among
agents in general, but does not offer a solution to the game.
As knowledge sharing among co-workers includes the interaction of multiple agents the
principal-agent models of Itoh (1991), as well as, Auriol et al. (2002) are related to the
structuring of this paper. The models each describe a multi-task setting in which agents
can provide an individual effort to enhance their own output and a “helping” effort to
directly increase the performance measure of other workers. The efforts, therefore, can be
considered as substitutes. However, this approach differs from the setting considered in
this paper. Knowledge itself offers no direct value towards a firm’s output and only lowers
the disutility of providing an output-oriented effort. The sharing effort of one worker and
the productive effort of the other employee thus take the form of complements rather than
substitutes.
Kvaløy and Scho¨ttner (2015) analyze the optimization problem of a principal that hires
two employees with separate tasks. One agent is tasked with producing an output, whereas
the second agent provides a motivational support for the former. Motivation is assumed
enjoyable to the receiving agent and has a reducing effect on his effort costs. The structur-
ing of the cost function of the agent that receives the support is similar to the one in this
paper as shared knowledge is also assumed to reduce an agent’s effort cost. However, in
their modeling the agents assume separate roles within the organization and as such, the
analysis of the interaction among employees is not emphasized. They instead focus their
attention on the trade-off between monetary and motivational incentives.
Lee and Ahn (2007) provide a principal-agent model for knowledge sharing and also model
the loss of private benefits when doing so. However, they assume that measures for knowl-
edge sharing are in place and that it adds direct value to the firm. They further construct
the model in a manner that suggests that more experienced workers should be induced
to share more, because they lose less utility of private knowledge. They also argue that
knowledge from experienced workers contributes more towards firm performance.
Siemsen et al. (2007) shortly analyze the impact of knowledge sharing on the effort cost
of the receiving agent and demonstrate that multiple types of incentives are necessary for
knowledge sharing to have any effect on performance. The holder of knowledge must be
provided with an incentive to share his valuable information and the recipient must be
provided with an incentive to apply the shared knowledge. However, the model itself is
not further investigated.
Nan (2008) also develops a principal-agent model that focuses on incentive designs for
different types of knowledge, which vary in their visibility and verifiability. In this model
knowledge can either be explicit, thus easily transferable with low intangibility such as
data or documents, or tacit with high intangibility such as expertise or experience. The
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developed model derives the optimal incentive scheme for knowledge sharing in regards to
the tangibility of shared knowledge. However, sharing is the only considered effort and no
further trade-offs between the creation or application of knowledge are considered.
Finally, Sundaresan and Zhang (2004) propose a principal-agent model in which only the
more knowledgeable employee can share his knowledge, whereas the less knowledgeable
worker can only absorb the shared knowledge. Furthermore, they model an IT system that
supports the agents knowledge collecting and donating activities by reducing the effort
costs of agents. In the model, a combined team output is considered and the sharing and
absorption efforts are, to some extent, considered to be observable.
3 The Model
The principal-agent model is developed in three distinct settings. First, only a single risk-
averse agent who has the opportunity to generate additional knowledge before performing
a task related effort is considered. In the second setting, multiple agents further have the
option to exchange their generated knowledge to indirectly affect the productive output
of each other. In the third setting, the principal also has to decide whether she wants to
invest in a knowledge management system to i) decrease the cost of knowledge sharing and
ii) to provide a signal to monitor the amount of knowledge shared. In order to keep the
structure of the model simple, the well-known LEN-framework is utilized with linear bonus
functions, exponential utility functions and normally distributed noise terms.1
3.1 Single agent with learning
In the first setting, the multi-task model consists of a risk neutral principal and a risk
averse employee who is tasked to provide a knowledge intensive effort. The employee’s
output is given as follows:
y = e · b + ε
Where b > 0 denotes the employee’s commonly known contribution of effort towards the
task related output y. The noise of the performance measure is represented by ε and is
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Before the employee engages in effort
(e) to fulfill the task, he has the option of exerting a learning effort denoted as kc (knowledge
creation) to gather further information about the task. This effort can be understood as
improving existing production/work processes, streamlining routines to avoid redundancies
or simply spending time and effort to increase the personal skill level. Doing so will lower
the cost of providing the output oriented effort (e). This effect is represented as a reduction
in the effort costs of the employee and has an indirect influence on his output. The cost of
efforts e and kc are denoted as:
C(e, kc) = 12
(
ce · e2
kc +
ckc · kc2
p · k
)
1 See for example Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for a detailed description of a linear multi-task principal-
agent model.
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The additive components of the cost function imply that there is no crowding-out effect
between the two efforts. The parameters ce ≥ 1 and ckc ≥ 1 represent scalars for the
effort costs and knowledge creation costs respectively. Furthermore, the agent receives a
private benefit (p ≥ 1) by having a greater understanding and knowledge level due to
learning, which can be understood as a feeling of superiority, power or as competitive
advantage on the job market due to privately owning specific knowledge about certain
production processes (Loebecke et al., 1999). An increase in the private benefit lowers the
agent’s marginal effort costs of learning additional knowledge.2 For example, a worker who
anticipates that his current contract might end soon, will be more willing to spend further
effort into increasing his skills compared to an employee whose position is secure and who
is unlikely to be competing in the job market in the near future. Finally, the parameter
k ≥ 1 denotes the cognitive capacity of the employee. This represents the general ability to
absorb and apply knowledge and in turn decreases the cost of the knowledge creation effort
kc. The assumption that additional knowledge and information have a positive influence
on effort costs is in line with current literature (e.g. Davenport and Prusak (1998), Baum
and Ingram (1998), Argote and Ingram (2000)).3 In summary, the sequence of events is
displayed in the following figure:
Figure 1: Single agent with learning
0 1 2 3 4
principal offers
contract to agent
agent accepts
or refuses
agent chooses
learning effort
agent exerts task
related effort
output is realized,
agent receives payoff
The agent’s salary function s(y) is a linear function of the output y with incentive coefficient
α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) and ζ as fixed remuneration:
s(y) = ζ+ α · y
The agent is assumed to be risk averse with r as the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant
absolute risk-aversion. Hence, the preferences of the employee can be described by his
utility function given as:
U(s(y), e, kc) = –exp(–r(s(y) – C(e, kc)))
Following the structure of the LEN-framework (Spremann, 1987), the agent’s certainty
2 It might seem more intuitive to model the benefit of keeping knowledge private as a direct increase of
the agent’s marginal utility, for example as an additive component in the form of p(kc). However, this
greatly increases the complexity of the results and the optimal bonus coefficients would no longer be
interpretable. Therefore, the agent’s benefit of additional knowledge is modeled to decrease his disutility
of the knowledge creation effort.
3 A version of the model, where the knowledge creation effort has a more direct impact on the agents’
output is considered to take the form of y = (1 + kc) · b · e. This modeling provides similar results for
the optimal effort levels, however, provides no interior solution for the optimal bonus coefficients.
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equivalent can then be expressed as:
CE = E[s(y)] – C(e, kc) – r2 · VAR[s(y)]
3.1.1 Benchmark solution
As a benchmark for the optimization problem, the first-best solution is considered, where
both the task-related effort and the knowledge creation effort of the agent are observable
and verifiable by the principal; whose optimization problem can then be described by:
max
e, kc
π = E[y – s(y)]
subject to:
E[s(y)] – C(e, kc) ≥ 0 (PC)
In this setting, the principal can set a fixed remuneration for the agent and no effort
incentives are necessary, therefore the agent bears no risk. The optimal fixed compensation
must only compensate the agent’s disutility of effort since his reservation utility, for the
purpose of this paper, is set to zero. Constructing the total surplus and solving for the
optimal effort levels provides the following solution:
Lemma 1. The first-best effort levels are given by:
eFB = b · kc
FB
ce
, kcFB =
(
k · p · ce · (eFB)2
2 · ckc
) 1
3
after substitution:
eFB = b
3 · k · p
2 · c2e · ckc
, kcFB = b
2 · k · p
2 · ce · ckc
resulting equilibrium surplus equals:
πFB = b
4 · k · p
8 · c2e · ckc
It is apparent that the equilibrium surplus increases with the marginal productivity of
effort (b), the agent’s cognitive capacity (k) and the private benefit of knowledge (p), but
decreases with the effort costs (ce, ckc). Furthermore, both effort levels increase in each
other, thus take the form of complements.
3.1.2 Under moral hazard
Under the assumption that both effort levels are unobservable for the principal and that
only the signal y is available for contracting, the principal’s optimization problem extends
to:
max
α
E[y – s(y)]
subject to:
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CE ≥ 0 (PC)
e, kc = argmaxCE (IC)
The incentive constraint (IC) ensures that the agent chooses the optimal effort levels depen-
dent upon his certainty equivalent and the incentive coefficient α, whereas the participation
constraint (PC) ensures that the agent accepts the contract. To solve the optimization
problem the agent first chooses his optimal effort levels given his certainty equivalent. This
result is then substituted into the optimization problem of the principal, which provides
the following solutions:
Lemma 2. The second-best effort levels are given by:
eSB = α · b · kc
SB
ce
, kcSB =
(
k · p · ce · (eSB)2
2 · ckc
) 1
3
and after substitution:
eSB = α
3 · b3 · k · p
2 · c2e · ckc
, kcSB = α
2 · b2 · k · p
2 · ce · ckc
resulting equilibrium surplus equals:
πSB = α
3 · b4 · k · p
2 · c2e · ckc
– 3 · α
4 · b4 · k · p
8 · c2e · ckc
– r · α
2 · σ2
2
From lemma 2 it is apparent that it is optimal for the agent to invest in the knowledge
creation effort when his incentives to provide a productive effort increase. However, the
optimal knowledge creation effort under second-best reacts only weakly to the monetary
incentive provided by the coefficient α, but in fact is much stronger influenced by the
private benefit the agent experiences due a higher level of knowledge. The knowledge
creation effort is not directly affected by the bonus coefficient, but instead increases when
the task-related effort increases. Hence, the principal is not able to set incentives for
knowledge creation directly and can only control the motivation for the productive effort.
This result is similar to findings of Feltham and Xie (1994) such that the principal can
only influence to total intensity of effort but not the proportional division among multiple
tasks as no separate performance measure for the knowledge intensive effort is available
for contracting. However, she could influence the intrinsic benefits the agent enjoys from
knowledge by, for example, providing the agent with additional autonomy over findings or
instituting employee recognition programs. Google’s ”20% time policy” is often mentioned
as a prime example for companies which offer employees additional time to work on their
own projects and sharpen their skills (Laux, 2017). Hence:
Proposition 1. The principal can set the bonus coefficient α to provide stronger or weaker
incentives to provide both the productive and the knowledge creation effort, but cannot set
the proportional allocation among tasks.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that it seems intuitive to assume that the agent would
increase his efforts to generate additional knowledge to substitute for the cost of effort
(ce). However, this effect is not strong enough to compensate for the absolute reduction
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in the task-related effort when the costs increase. Knowledge itself adds no direct value
to the performance measure and if the output related effort decreases, the optimal level of
knowledge creation also decreases. Ultimately, the latter effect outweighs the substitution
effect and the agent generates less knowledge as the cost of the task-related effort increases.4
Utilizing the equilibrium surplus to solve for the bonus coefficient α results in:
Proposition 2. The optimal incentive coefficient α is denoted as:
α = 12 +
√
9 · b4 · k2 · p2 – 24 · c2e · ckc · k · p · r · σ2
6 · b2 · k · p
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal bonus coefficient increases in the agent’s marginal
productivity of task related effort (b), his cognitive capacity (k) and private benefit of
knowledge (p). However, reduces in the effort cost of the output oriented effort (ce), the
effort cost of creating knowledge (ckc), the variance of the output (σ2) and the agent’s risk
aversion (r).
3.2 Multiple agents with learning and sharing
In this extension of the first setting, it is now assumed that the organization employs a
second agent. Both agents, indexed by i ∈ I = 1, 2, are tasked with performing an output
orientated work effort and can, as in the single agent setting, exert a learning effort to
”sharpen their skills” before beginning their work. However, in this new setting the agents
can also strategically share their knowledge (ksi) with one another to effectively lower each
other’s cost of providing the productive effort. Both employees work on their own projects,
thus their performance is separable and measured by their individual output levels yi. The
extended sequence of events is shown in the following figure:
Figure 2: Multiple agents with learning and sharing
0 1 2 3 4 5
principal offers
contract to
each agent
agents accept
or refuse
agents choose
learning effort
agents choose how
much knowledge
to share
agents exert task
related effort
outputs are
realized, agents
receive payoff
Sharing is costly to the agents in two ways: agents need to spend time and effort to make
their individual knowledge transferable, this for example represents the cost of organizing
information or documenting procedures. Furthermore, the sharing agent values his private
knowledge, which provides him with an implicit incentive to instead hoard it. To express
the disutility from sharing private knowledge the effort cost for sharing increases in pi,
4 To keep the model traceable in the multi-agent setting all effort cost factors are set to equal 1 for the
remainder of the paper, such that: cei = ckci = cksi = 1.
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whereas the costs for generating knowledge still decrease in it. Hence, the total cost of
efforts for each agent expands to:
Ci(ei, kci, ksi) =
1
2 ·
(
e2i
kci + ksj
+ kc
2
i
ki · pi
+ ks
2
i · pi
ki · kj
)
where j ∈ I \ i
To indicate that it requires less effort to learn from others than privately generating knowl-
edge, the effort costs for sharing knowledge decrease in the cognitive capacity (ki) of both
agents combined. Intuitively one could say that a sharing agent with a high cognitive
capacity is better able to structure his knowledge so that the recipient needs to spend
less effort deciphering the information. Given the earlier payoff structure of the agents, it
should be obvious, that the individual incentive coefficient (αi) alone is not sufficient to
induce the agents to share their knowledge with each other, so that ∂ksi∂αi = 0. Hence, it is
necessary to implement a collective incentive coefficient βi such that the wage function of
agents extends to:
si(yi, yj) = αi · yi + βi · yj + ζi
It is assumed that each agent’s individual output yi is observable and verifiable and that
there is no combined team output. By structuring each agent’s wage function so that payoff
also depends on the performance of the other agent contingent on the bonus coefficient βi,
the principal can induce teamwork among the agents. This form of wage scheme is normally
referred to as relative performance evaluation (RPE). Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee
(1984) show that this structure can be utilized to insure the agents against risk by filtering
out common shocks. This is however only possible if the individual outputs are correlated.
In such a setting the collective incentive coefficient normally receives a negative sign to even
out the scale and to isolate the common shock (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). However,
Itoh (1991) shows that utilizing RPE is detrimental when trying to induce cooperation
among agents. Here, both outputs are assumed to be stochastically independent and that
there are no insurance benefits by applying RPE. The variance of the agents’ salary can
be described as:
VAR(si) = α2i · σ2i + β2i · σ2j
The agents can, however, actively influence the performance of co-workers by sharing valu-
able knowledge. When one employee supports the other, the effort costs of the second agent
decrease and his equilibrium output, in turn, will increase, which enhances the wage of the
first agent. Under this premise it is plausible to assume that all incentive coefficients are
greater than or at least equal to zero in order to induce the agents to cooperate. Besides
the effort costs for sharing the agents’ problem arises through the trade-off between the
implicit benefit of keeping knowledge private and the monetary incentive they receive when
supporting other agents.
3.2.1 Benchmark solution
Agents can only share knowledge that they previously have generated themselves, such
that ksi ≤ kci (sharing constraint). This adds an additional constraint to the principal’s
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optimization problem. When constructing the Lagrangian of the optimization problem it
is unclear whether this sharing restriction is binding, thus there are multiple solutions to
this problem, which can be expressed as:
max
ei, kci, ksi
π =
n∑
i=1
E[yi – si(yi, yj)]
subject to:
E[si(yi, yj)] – Ci(ei, kci, ksi) ≥ 0 (PC)
ksi ≤ kci (SC)
∀ i = 1, 2
Solving the Lagrangian of the problem provides the following results:5
Lemma 3. The first-best effort levels are given by:
eFBi = bi · (kcFBi + ksFBj )
kcFBi = max
{
b2i · ki · pi
2 ;
ki · kj · pi ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
kj + p2i
)
}
ksFBi = max
{
b2j · ki · kj
2 · pi
;
ki · kj · pi ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
kj + p2i
)
}
and after substitution:
eFBi (1, 2, 3, 4) = (1) = bi ·
(
b2i · ki · pi
2 +
b2i · ki · kj
2 · pj
)
(2) = bi ·
⎛
⎝b2i · ki · pi
2 +
ki · kj · pj ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
ki + p2j
)
⎞
⎠
(3) = bi ·
⎛
⎝ki · kj · pi ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
kj + p2i
) + b2i · ki · kj2 · pj
⎞
⎠
(4) = bi ·
⎛
⎝ki · kj · pi ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
kj + p2i
) + ki · kj · pj ·
(
b2i + b2j
)
2 ·
(
ki + p2j
)
⎞
⎠
An agents knowledge creation effort can either be low= b
2
i ·ki·pi
2 or high=
ki·kj·pi·
(
b2i +b2j
)
2·(kj+p2i )
.
The low level of effort equals the first-best effort level of knowledge creation in the single
agent setting and denotes an equilibrium where an agent is not motivated to increase his
knowledge creation effort (kci) to support the other agent. This solution is referred to
5 The optimization problem of the principal can be described as: L = biei + bjej – Ci(ei, kci, ksi) –
Cj(ej, kcj, ksj) – λi(kci – ksi) – λj(kcj – ksj) with λi and λj as the Lagrange multipliers for the sharing
constraints.
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as the individual equilibrium level of knowledge creation. If a worker exerts the low level
of knowledge creation effort, he will only share part of his knowledge with ksi < b
2
i ·ki·pi
2 .
However, if an agent is motivated to exert the high level of creation effort, he will always
share his knowledge completely and ksi = kci. As both agents can engage in the high
or low level of knowledge creation and sharing there are four solutions of the optimal
productive effort denoted as (1, 2, 3, 4). In (1) both agents create knowledge according
to their individual equilibrium. In (2) and (3) one of the agents will create and share
above his individual equilibrium, whereas in (4) both agents will create and share above
their individual solution. The threshold for when an agent should switch strategies can
be derived from the levels of creation and sharing. An agent will provide the low level of
creative effort and sharing until ksi =
b2j ·ki·kj
2·pi > kci =
b2i ·ki·pi
2 , which can be rearranged to
provide:
Proposition 3. Given the threshold:
b2j
b2i
>
p2i
kj
it is optimal for agent i to generate and share knowledge above his individual equilibrium.
Intuitively, b
2
j
b2i
represents the ratio of the agents’ marginal productivities, whereas the
right hand side represents the additional costs for sharing knowledge. In other words, if
the increase in the recipient’s output upon receiving an additional unit of knowledge is
greater than the sender’s costs for sharing (p2i b2i ), then the less productive agent (in this
setting agent i) will focus his attention towards the creation and provision of additional
knowledge to take advantage of the high productivity of the other agent. In this case agent
i should choose an effort level for knowledge creation above his individual optimum. By
doing so the less efficient worker can exploit the productivity of the other worker. This is
in contrast to earlier findings in the literature. Sundaresan and Zhang (2004) and Lee and
Ahn (2007) report that it is in the interest of the principal that only the more knowledgeable
and skilled employee should share his knowledge to increase the productivity of the less
skilled worker and to even out the performance differences among them. However, here the
less productive worker assumes the role of a supporting agent and focuses on creating and
providing knowledge for the more productive worker. Through this teamwork arrangement
the high productivity of worker j is leveraged as much as possible and agent i’s focus lies
on further decreasing worker j’s cost of effort. When the threshold is not reached and the
agents are similar in their marginal productivity of effort, they work well as a team and
will both create and share knowledge at their individual optimum. From lemma 3 it follows
that the resulting equilibrium surpluses then are:
Lemma 4. The first-best equilibrium surpluses are:6
(1) πFB =
b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj
8pipj
6 See the appendix for a comparison of the individual equilibria.
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(2) πFB =
ki(b4i p2i p2j + b4i kip2i + b4i kjpipj + 2b2i b2j kjpipj + b4j kjpipj + b4j kjp2j + b4j kikj)
8pi(ki + p2j )
(3) πFB =
kj(b4j p2j p2i + b4j kjp2j + b4j kipjpi + 2b2j b2i kipjpi + b4i kipjpi + b4i kip2i + b4i kjki)
8pj(kj + p2i )
(4) πFB =
kikj(b2i + b2j )2(p2i pj + pip2j + kipi + kjpj)
8(p2i + kj)(p2j + ki)
A comparison of the results with and without knowledge sharing further provides:
Corollary 1. It is optimal for the principal to induce knowledge sharing among agents.
If, for example, both agents are equal, the value added of knowledge sharing compared
to no exchange among agents equals Δπ = b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj, which is strictly positive.7
Hence, the equilibrium surplus with knowledge sharing is strictly greater than without and
it is in the first-best setting always optimal for the principal if agents cooperate. Sharing or
exchanging knowledge combines the expertise and cognitive capacity of agents (represented
by k), thus sharing is assumed to be less costly then individually creating a high amount of
knowledge. Agents that work together can leverage benefits of mutual knowledge creation
and sharing to generate a larger stock of knowledge than individual agents. This finding
further highlights and provides methodological proof of predictions from the behavioral
science and empirical findings reported by Argote and Ingram (2000), Baum and Ingram
(1998).
3.2.2 Under moral hazard
Under moral hazard, the effort levels of the agents are again no longer observable or
verifiable by the principal. However, it is assumed that the agents can anticipate each
other’s willingness to adopt shared knowledge. This is intuitive as most knowledge sharing
is done with direct contact between the agents. It is often also assumed that a majority of
knowledge exchange at the workplace takes place during off-hours or in situations in which
there is some slack, for example during downtimes, lunch, social events or the so called
water-cooler talks (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). Therefore, knowledge exchange does
not negatively affect the effort exerted into their individual tasks (crowding-out) and the
sharing agent can directly observe the recipients effort to apply the new information. For
the remainder of this section the focus lies on the constellation of agents that are similar
in their marginal productivities, so that no agent supposedly takes on the role of support
for the higher skilled employee. Furthermore, this limits the possible solutions and isolates
the incentive provided by the bonus coefficients.8 The principal’s optimization problem
under moral hazard can be described by:
max
αi, βi
π =
n∑
i=1
E[(1 – αi – βj) · yi]
subject to:
7 See the appendix for a proof of corollary 1.
8 An overview of all possible solutions is available from the author upon request.
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CEi = αi · yi + βi · yj – Ci(ei, kci, ksi) –
ri
2 · VAR(si) ≥ 0 (PC)
ei, kci, ksi = argmaxCEi (IC)
ksi ≤ kci (SC)
∀ i = 1, 2
Through the sharing constraint (SC) the principal is further able to influence the agents’
willingness to generate additional knowledge by setting a high bonus coefficient dependent
upon the performance of the other agent. With a strong incentive to share knowledge
the agent respectively has an implicit incentive to further generate additional knowledge.
Solving the Lagrangian of the optimization problem provides the following results:
Lemma 5. Under asymmetric information, the optimal effort levels are given by:
eSBi = αibi · (kcSBi + ksSBj )
kcSBi = max
{
b2i kipi(αi + βj)2
2 ;
b2i b2j kikjpi(αi + βj)2(αj + βi)2
2(p2i + kj)
}
ksSBi = max
{
αjβib2j kikj
pi
;
b2i b2j kikjpi(αi + βj)2(αj + βi)2
2(p2i + kj)
}
and after substitution:
ei(1, 2, 3, 4) = (1) = αibi
(
b2i kipi(αi + βj)2
2 +
αiβjb2i kikj
pj
)
(2) = αibi
(
b2i kipi(αi + βj)2
2 +
b2i b2j kikjpj(αj + βi)2(αi + βj)2
2(p2j + ki)
)
(3) = αibi
(
b2i b2j kikjpi(αi + βj)2(αj + βi)2
2(p2i + kj)
+
αiβjb2i kikj
pj
)
(4) = αibi
(
b2i b2j kikjpi(αi + βj)2(αj + βi)2
2(p2i + kj)
+
b2i b2j kikjpj(αj + βi)2(αi + βj)2
2(p2j + ki)
)
In the setting under moral hazard, the principal can utilize the bonus coefficients αj and βi
to provide the agents with incentives to generate more knowledge than in the single agent
case. The necessary condition can be derived similar to the first-best setting and is reached
when:9
αj + βi
αi + βj
>
bi
bj
pi√
kj
To easier interpret the result, the threshold can be rearranged to: (αj+βi)bj(αi+βj)bi >
pi√
kj
. The
9 The equilibrium level of knowledge creation of each agent switches when ksi > kci, so when the agent
wants to share more knowledge to the other agent then he would create in his individual optimum. This
threshold is reached when αjβib
2
j kikj
pi >
b2i kipi(αi+βj)
2
2 .
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left hand side represents the additional benefit agent i receives for sharing one additional
unit of knowledge whereas the right hand side represents the additional costs of doing so,
which provides:
Proposition 4. By setting the bonus coefficients αj and βi sufficiently high, the principal
can in the multi-agent setting control each agent’s proportional allocation of efforts among
tasks.
Substituting the agents’ optimal effort levels (ei(1)), while focusing on the case in which
both agents provide the low level of knowledge creation provides the equilibrium surplus:
(1); πSB = α
3
i b4i kipi
2 +
α2i βjb4i kikj
pj
+
α3j b4j kjpj
2 +
α2j βib4j kikj
pi
– 3α
4
i b4i kipi
8 –
α3i βjb4i kikj
2pj
–
α2j β
2
i b4j kikj
2pi
–
3α4j b4j kjpj
8 –
α3j βib4j kikj
2pi
–
α2i β
2
j b4i kikj
pj
– riα
2
i σ
2
i
2 –
riβ2i σ2j
2 –
rjα2j σ2j
2 –
rjβ2j σ2i
2
Solving for the optimal bonus coefficients then results in:
Proposition 5. Under asymmetric information, the optimal incentive coefficients are
given by:
αi =
1
2 –
βjkj
2pipj
+ 1
6kipipjb2i
(30b4i βjk2i kjpipj + 9b4i k2i p2i p2j + 9b4i β2j k2i k2j
– 24b4i β2j k2i kjpipj – 24kipip2j riσ2i )0.5
βi =
2α2j b4j kikj – α3j b4j kikj
2(α2j b
4
j kikj + piriσ2j )
Due to the strategic interaction among agents the interpretability of the optimal bonus
coefficients is limited. However, from proposition 5 it is apparent that the individual
bonus coefficient αi decreases in the agent’s risk aversion and the variance of his personal
performance measure. The sharing incentive βi also decreases in the agent’s risk aversion
and in the variance of the other agent’s output measure, but increases in the marginal
productivity of effort and cognitive capacity of the receiving agent.10 Furthermore, the
optimal bonus coefficient to share knowledge increases in the incentive of the receiving
agent to apply the knowledge, which leads to:
Proposition 6. An agent’s motivation to share his knowledge depends upon the recipi-
ent’s incentive to apply the provided knowledge, thus both the individual and the collective
incentives have to be in place.11
∂ksi
∂αi
= 0; ∂ksi
∂αj
=
βib2j kikj
pi
≥ 0;
∂ksi
∂βi
=
αjb2j kikj
pi
≥ 0; ∂ksi
∂βj
= 0; ∂ksi
∂αj∂βi
=
b2j kikj
pi
> 0
10 Further effects on the optimal bonus coefficients are ambiguous.
11 A similar result has also been reported by Siemsen et al. (2007).
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This finding highlights one of the main differences of knowledge sharing compared to other
team-incentive models. For example, in Auriol et al. (2002) agents can directly increase
the output of other team members by providing a helping effort. Through the additive
design of the model, the principal can provide incentives for each effort and each agent
individually. Hence, the personal working effort and helping effort take on the form of
substitutes contingent on their marginal productivities. However, knowledge does not add
direct value towards an output, but only increases the recipient’s productivity indirectly by
lowering the disutility of effort. Thus, without an incentive to adapt and leverage the shared
knowledge, the sender’s sharing effort is wasted completely. Ultimately, both the sender’s
incentive to provide knowledge and the recipient’s incentive to exert a task-related effort
need to be in place. Furthermore, from proposition 6 it follows that when the incentive
to support the other agent with knowledge is sufficiently high the agents will also increase
their level of the knowledge creation effort to kci =
b2i b2j kikjpi(αi+βj)2(αj+βi)2
2(p2i +kj)
and therefore
the partial derivatives from knowledge creation towards the bonus coefficients are:
∂kci
∂αi
=
αib2i kikjpi
kj + p2i
+
βjb2i kikjpi
kj + p2i
≥ 0; ∂kci
∂αj
=
αjb2j kikjpi
kj + p2i
+
βib2j kikjpi
kj + p2i
≥ 0
∂kci
∂βi
=
αjb2j kikjpi
kj + p2i
+
βib2j kikjpi
kj + p2i
≥ 0; ∂kci
∂βj
=
αib2i kikjpi
kj + p2i
+
βjb2i kikjpi
kj + p2i
≥ 0
∂ksi
∂αi∂βj
=
b2i kikjpi
kj + p2i
> 0; ∂ksi
∂αj∂βi
=
b2j kikjpi
kj + p2i
> 0
Here, each derivative consists of two additive components, with the assumption that the
bonus coefficients are positive an agent’s incentive to generate additional knowledge in-
creases in all available coefficients, but decreases in the private benefit of knowledge. In
the earlier setting, it was shown that the degree to which employees value their skills level
lowers the cost of creating knowledge. Here the decrease due to the private benefit results
from the solution that the agent will share everything he knows and sharing reduces in the
benefit of keeping knowledge private.
4 Extension: Effects of implementing a knowledge manage-
ment system
In this setting, the principal also has the opportunity to invest into a knowledge manage-
ment system (kms). Implementing a km-system has two separate effects that are analyzed
individually. First, there is a cost reduction effect, which lowers the overall effort costs
for sharing knowledge through the system. Second, an information effect, the new system
provides the principal with an additional signal that is informative about ksi. The signal
is denoted as zi = ksi and can be utilized for contracting. Agents receive a bonus payment
denoted as γi for each unit of knowledge that they share when utilizing the kms. With the
signal in place each agent’s wage function becomes:
si(yi, zi) = αi · yi + γi · zi + ζi
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It is assumed that the information technology provides a perfect signal about the amount
of knowledge shared. Therefore, the bonus coefficient contingent on the co-workers perfor-
mance measure is no longer part of the wage function. This reduces the risk of each agent’s
salary as the noisy performance measure of the other agent is replaced by the reporting
function of the km-system.
4.1 Benchmark solution
The benefit (cost decrease of sharing knowledge) of the information system is denoted as
bkms, whereas the additional costs of the system are expressed as ckms. The agents can
utilize the system to communicate with each other, ask questions and provide answers.
This reduces the cost of participating in a knowledge exchange. The additional costs in
this case can be understood as the depreciation of the financial investment in each period,
which lowers the profit of the principal. The decision that is considered here, is a binary
[0,1] decision of whether or not to invest in a km-system and not about how much to
invest. In order to separate the impact of the investment the equilibrium solutions with
and without the knowledge management system are compared. With a km-system in place
the cost function of the agents changes to:
Ci(ei, kci, ksi) =
1
2 ·
(
e2i
kci + ksj
+ kc
2
i
ki · pi
+ ks
2
i · pi
ki · kj · bkms
)
The principal’s optimization problem is almost identical to that of the second setting, here
the principal only has to bear the additional costs of the km-system (ckms). Since under
first-best all efforts are observable and verifiable the principal only has to pay the agents
a fixed remuneration that satisfies their participation constraint. For analytical purposes
the focus is set on a setting in which the agents’ marginal productivities of effort are in
the range that limits the amount of solutions to one. Solving the principal’s optimization
problem then provides:
Lemma 6. The first-best effort levels are given by:
eFBi =
b3i · ki · (bkms · kj + pi · pj)
2pj
kcFBi =
b2i · ki · pi
2
ksFBi =
b2j · bkms · ki · kj
2 · pi
and resulting equilibrium surplus equals:
πFB =
b4i bkmskikjpi + b4i kip2i pj + b4j bkmskikjpj + b4j kjpip2j – 8ckmspipj
8pipj
In optimum the cost reduction effect (bkms) increases the optimal knowledge sharing levels
and in turn indirectly also the optimal level of productive efforts, which increase when
agents receive additional knowledge. The resulting equilibrium surplus then increases in
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the benefit of the system and decreases in its costs (ckms). Comparing the first-best sur-
pluses with and without an investment into information technology provides the following
condition:
Proposition 7. When comparing the optimal results with and without the investment into
a km-system, the necessary condition for implementation of a system is obtained:12
bkms ≥
b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj + 8ckmspipj
kikj(b4i pi + b4j pj)
or, assuming that both agents are equal:
bkms ≥ 1 +
4pckms
b4k2
Under the assumption that both agents are equal, the result is easily interpretable. Here, in
first-best the effort levels of the agents are already observable, thus the information effect of
the knowledge management system plays no role and only the cost effect is analyzed. The
principal’s optimal decision to implement an information technology largely depends upon
three factors: i) The ratio of benefits of kms compared to the implementation costs (bkmsckms ).
ii) If agents have a high intrinsic benefit of private knowledge they are more likely to hoard,
rather than to share their expertise and the overall effect of introducing a knowledge sharing
platform is reduced greatly. This solution is very intuitive, if agents are normally reluctant
to share their knowledge, merely lowering the effort costs of doing so will not provide the
agents with necessary incentives. This further highlights and provides a methodological
explanation of the assumptions of McDermott (1999). In such a case it would be better
for a company to lower the benefit of keeping knowledge private by providing long term
job positions, so that employees do not hoard knowledge in order to stand out on the job
market. iii) Lastly, the benefit of a knowledge management system greatly increases as
the marginal productivity and cognitive capacity of agents increases. This is also quite
intuitive as more productive agents can better utilize the shared knowledge.
4.2 Under Moral Hazard
For the moral hazard setting the focus is set on the case that b
2
j
b2i
>
p2i
kj and that agent i fo-
cuses his attention on generating and sharing knowledge with agent j. With the information
system in place, the optimization problem of the principal is expressed by:
max
αi,γi
π =
n∑
i=1
(
E[(1 – αi) · yi] – γi · zi
)
– ckms
subject to:
CEi = s(yi, zi) – C(ei, kci, ksi) –
ri
2 · VAR(si) ≥ 0 (PC)
ei, kci, ksi = argmaxCEi (IC)
ksi ≤ kci (SC)
12 See appendix for a proof.
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with :
VAR(si) = α2i · σ2i ∀ i = 1, 2
Forming the Lagrangian of the optimization problem and solving for the optimal effort
levels while excluding the solutions in which both agents provide identical effort levels
provides:
Lemma 7. The second-best effort levels are given by:
eSBi = αibi(kcSBi + ksSBj ); eSBj = αjbj(kcSBj + ksSBi )
kcSBi =
kipibkmskj(α2i b2i + α2j b2j + 2γi)
2(bkmskj + p2i )
; kcSBj =
α2j b2j kjpj
2
ksSBi =
kipibkmskj(α2i b2i + α2j b2j + 2γi)
2(bkmskj + p2i )
; ksSBj =
bkmskikj(α2i b2i + 2γj)
2pj
From lemma 7 it is apparent that the degree of knowledge sharing increases in the cost
reduction effect of the kms as well as the bonus payment γi. Substituting the agents’
optimal effort levels into the principals optimization problem and solving for the bonus
payments γi provides:
Proposition 8. The optimal incentive bonuses for sharing knowledge are:
γi = b2i (αi – α2i ) + bj(αj – α2j )
γj = b2i (αi – α2i )
The optimal bonus coefficient for the first agent, which is set high to induce him to create
additional knowledge and support the second agent, depends upon his individual incentive
coefficient (αi) and on the motivation of the other agent to apply the shared knowledge
(αj). Whereas the bonus of the second agent only depends upon the incentive coefficient
of the first.13
5 Discussion
As outlined in the introduction and related literature review the economic understanding
of appropriate incentives that enable knowledge sharing among co-workers is still limited.
The present paper addresses this gap by providing a framework to analyze the interaction
of employees who can create and subsequently share knowledge with one another.
The model builds upon the assumption that knowledge reduces the disutility of providing
an output related effort and therefore the effect is modeled directly into the cost function
of each agent. Literature suggests that knowledge reduces the time needed to complete
a task (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Therefore, the effect of knowledge could arguably be
modeled to enhance a worker’s marginal productivity directly. Which was avoided in this
13 A comparison of the second-best results with and without the km-system is inconclusive due to the
different setups of the agents’ salary functions and different utilized signals.
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framework to ensure the interpretability of results. Likewise, the intrinsic benefit employ-
ees feel when keeping knowledge private is modeled as a parameter that lowers the effort
costs of knowledge creation and on the other hand increases the cost for sharing knowledge
with co-workers. This private benefit can be described as a feeling of power, superiority or
just the general appreciation of the personal skill level. The effect of such a benefit could
also be added directly to the preferences of the agent. Lee and Ahn (2007), for example,
construct a concave utility function dependent upon the monopolistic knowledge of each
employee. Furthermore, as a simplification it is assumed that workers do not need to exert
any effort to collect shared knowledge. It is possible that equilibria exist in which one
agent has a high-powered incentive to share more knowledge than another agent would
be willing to absorb. On the other hand, highly skilled agents might share knowledge too
complex to be absorbed by less trained agents. As discussed by Argote and Ingram (2000)
not all shared insights are valuable towards the generation of outputs. When a company
installs measures for knowledge sharing, but the quality of knowledge cannot be observed
companies might end up with “information junkyards” (McDermott, 1999).
The main findings of the analysis are as follows: When the firm only employs a single agent,
the principal cannot directly influence the agent’s level of creating additional knowledge.
Only the productive output of the workers are observable and verifiable for contracting,
thus the problem can be described as a multi-task setting with a single signal. Hence, the
absolute level of the productive and the creative efforts can be increased or lowered, but
the principal cannot control the agent’s proportional allocation of time among the differ-
ent tasks (Feltham and Xie, 1994). However, this partly changes when the organization
hires additional employees. When co-workers can reciprocally influence each other’s cost
of effort and therefore indirectly enhance their output, additional signals become available
for contracting. It is shown that the organization can choose bonus coefficients contin-
gent upon the performance of co-workers, which leads agents to not only consider their
individual optimum level of knowledge creation, but also anticipate additional benefits of
sharing knowledge with co-workers. Such that if incentives to share their knowledge are
sufficiently high, agents will create knowledge above their individual optimum. However,
as demonstrated in the framework, knowledge itself does not add direct value towards firm
performance and its benefit towards the company, similar to other scarce resources, de-
pends upon the person that will be applying it. This differentiates the aspect of knowledge
sharing from team-incentive models in which one actor can directly influence the perfor-
mance of the other.
Furthermore, this leads to the interesting result that it is not necessarily in the best inter-
est of the principal to motivate high skilled employees to provide knowledge towards low
productive workers, as their opportunity costs of not focusing on the productive effort are
considerably higher. Instead, the less productive worker assumes the role of a support and
provides the former employee with knowledge to leverage his productivity. Which differs
from the assumption in the literature that more skilled workers should be responsible to
”sharpen the skills” of less effective employees (Lee and Ahn, 2007). However, the proposed
model is basically a one-shot game as the analyzed company only exists for one period and
agents focus on the maximization of short term rewards. For future research of the topic, it
could therefore be interesting to focus the attention on the long-term effects of knowledge
20
sharing. They might exist an equilibrium in which it is optimal to deviate from the optimal
one-shot solution to further diffuse knowledge among all employees to better leverage it in
the following periods.
Finally, the extension of the model analyzes potential effects of implementing a knowledge
management system. Two possible effects are considered. First, a reduction in costs can
occur, as knowledge can be stored and is more easily accessible by employees, furthermore
search costs of finding who knows what can be reduced. Second, the system provides an
additional signal that can be utilized for contracting. In the optimal solution, the individ-
ual bonus coefficient for each agent was derived. However, this might cause complications
within a firm. Companies that already utilize electronic knowledge management systems
generally award bonuses that are equal for all employees that provide information and
cannot set specific rewards for single agents (Davenport and Vo¨lpel, 2001). Thus in reality
companies are forced to set incentives that are either too strong, or not strong enough.
With this restriction the optimal solution can only be reached, as long as employees are
similar in their marginal productivities of effort.
Negative effects of knowledge sharing such as sabotage or free riding have not been con-
sidered in this model, but offer avenues for future research. As with most theoretical ap-
proaches, the model is highly simplified and ignores intrinsic incentives and cultural aspects
within a company. Furthermore, through the inclusion of multiple efforts that influence
one another multiplicatively the interpretability of certain results is limited. Nevertheless,
the analysis provides valuable insights into the knowledge sharing process and effects of
monetary rewards. The theoretical predictions of the model could be further improved
through empirical testing.
6 Conclusion
The proposed model provides a theoretical approach to investigate reward structures in a
multi-agent setting with the goal to simultaneously motivate the agents to create, share
and apply knowledge. However, knowledge is an intangible good and as such creation and
sharing efforts are difficult or costly to monitor. In the single agent setting it is possible to
investigate the enabling interaction of monetary incentives and private benefits of knowl-
edge on the creative effort. Whereas, in the multi-agent setting private benefits serve as a
barrier for knowledge sharing. The optimal effort level for sharing knowledge depends not
only on an agent’s personal incentive, but more importantly on the marginal productivity
and the incentive of the other agents to efficiently apply the shared knowledge. Employees
consider a trade-off between their personal productivity and private value towards their
knowledge versus the cognitive capacity and productivity of the receiving agent. Knowledge
itself adds no value towards firm performance but instead its worth for the organization
depends upon the person that applies it to produce output. Employees that are already
very productive can more effectively implement additional knowledge into their already
superior work routines. Thus, it is not necessarily in the best interest of the principal to
motivate skilled personnel to spend time and effort sharing knowledge with low productive
workers. A consideration that is not addressed in the model is the impact of long-run
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concerns. Foregoing short-run benefits and spending additional effort on sharpening the
skills of less productive workers might be preferred in a multi-period setting. Investments
into knowledge management systems, while not motivating agents directly, increases the
observability of the chosen activity levels. Furthermore, agents need less time to identify
the person with relevant information, thus sharing costs also decrease.
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Appendix
Comparison of equilibrium surpluses in the first-best multi agent setting:
The four resulting equilibrium surpluses are:
(1) =
b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj
8pipj
(2) =
ki(b4i p2i p2j + b4i kip2i + b4i kjpipj + 2b2i b2j kjpipj + b4j kjpipj + b4j kjp2j + b4j kikj)
8pi(ki + p2j )
(3) =
kj(b4j p2j p2i + b4j kjp2j + b4j kipjpi + 2b2j b2i kipjpi + b4i kipjpi + b4i kip2i + b4i kjki)
8pj(kj + p2i )
(4) =
kikj(b2i + b2j )2(p2i pj + pip2j + kipi + kjpj)
8(p2i + kj)(p2j + ki)
When both agents are symmetrical so that bi = bj, pbi = pbj, ki = kj it can be shown that
it is optimal for the principal to set the low sharing effort. The problem reduces to:
(1) = 2b
4kp3 + 2b4k2p
8p2
(2, 3) = k(b
4p4 + 6b4kp2 + b4k2)
8p(p2 + k)
(3) = b
4k2(2p3 + 2kp)
2(p2 + k)2
By comparing (1) and (2, 3) the following is obtained:
2b4kp3 + 2b4k2p
8p2 >
k(b4p4 + 6b4kp2 + b4k2)
8p(p2 + k)
2b4kp5 + 4b4k2p3 + 2b4k3p > b4kp5 + 6b4k2p3 + b4k3p
p4 – 2kp2 + k2 > 0
(–p2 + k)2 > 0
By comparing (1) and (4) the following is obtained:
2b4kp3 + 2b4k2p
8p2 >
b4k2(2p3 + 2kp)
2(p2 + k)2
2b4kp7 + 6b4k2p5 + 6b4k3p3 + 2b4k4p > 8b4k2p5 + 8b4k3p3
p6 – kp4 – k2p2 + k3 > 0
(p2 – k)2(p2 + k) > 0
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Hence, under the assumption that all parameters are greater or equal to one, it can be
shown that the equilibrium solutions (2,3,4) are never preferred to (1), when b
2
j
b2i
≤ p2ikj .
Proof of Corollary 1:
If both agents have similar marginal productivities and cooperate, the equilibrium surplus
equals:
πexchange = 18pjpi
(b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj)
Whereas without cooperation (knowledge hoarding), the equilibrium surplus equals:
πhoarding = 18(b
4
i kipi + b4j kjpj)
Computing the difference provides:
Δπ = 18pjpi
(b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj) –
1
8(b
4
i kipi + b4j kjpj)
= b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj – b4i kip2i pj – b4j kjpip2j
= b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj
Proof of Proposition 7:
When comparing the equilibrium surpluses with and without the knowledge management
system, the following is obtained:
πkms =
b4i bkmskikjpi + b4i kip2i pj + b4j bkmskikjpj + b4j kjpip2j – 8ckmspipj
8pipj
> πno kms =
b4i kip2i pj + b4j kjpip2j + b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj
8pipj
b4i bkmskikjpi + b4j bkmskikjpj > b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj + 8ckmspipj
bkms >
b4i kikjpi + b4j kikjpj + 8ckmspipj
kikj(b4i pi + b4j pj)
Note: This solution holds for a comparison of any of the four equilibrium surpluses.
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